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Abstract: The infinite and constantly developing options of medically assisted 
reproduction (MAR) reasonably raise the issue of its permitted range. Proponents 
of human rights fight for the strengthening of the reproductive right, the access to it 
by even more people, such as single parents, same-sex couples, elderly women, HIV 
carriers etc. Still concerning, however, is the fact that the defenders of human rights 
often forget the rights of the fetus or the child, which cannot be expressed with the 
same intensity. In the framework of the present study, we investigate the true inter-
ests of the child in MAR, in relation to the reproductive right in the light of some 
borderline cases.
Keywords: best interests of the child; medically assisted reproduction; reproduc-
tive right; HIV carriers; single-parent family; post-mortem fertilization; same-sex 
couples
Ι. The reproductive right
The reproductive ability lies at the core of human existence. The decision of whether 
(or not) to have children constitutes an expression of the free development of person-
ality1, as enshrined in article 5 par. 1 of the Greek Constitution. Having children plays 
a significant role in the development of one’s personality, “leading to a reassessment of 
values  and re-definition of the essential elements of one’s identity”2. The individual right 
to reproduction includes the right to MAR, without, however, entailing the individual 
claim of access to all types of methods, as it is confined only to those that are authorized3. 
Therefore, the free development of personality is constitutionally enshrined subject to the 
restriction that does not encroach upon the rights of others, the Constitution and prin-
ciples of morality4. The constitutional requirement for the non-violation of the rights of 
others promotes in essence, the protection of the best interests of the child. An unlimited 
freedom of reproduction is not enshrined, as it is confined to that which does not affect 
the rights of children.
From a philosophical point of view, it is expressed that it would be more ap-
propriate to speak of “legitimate desire” in the case of assisted reproduction, rather 
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than about an explicit right5. Furthermore, it is argued that “the calls we make for 
our reproductive autonomy do not, in any way, presuppose the individual right to 
autonomy”6. This does not imply that the use of MAR technologies is naturally unac-
ceptable, but rather it indicates that the invocation of the right to reproduction does 
not automatically justify their use7.
II. The best interests of the child
The assessment of the best interests of the child as a priority in all decisions con-
cerning thereof, whether made by legislators, administrative authorities, courts or by 
public or private social welfare institutions, is a key requirement of the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child8 and of article 24 par. 2 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It is noted that the Charter does not 
define the starting point of child protection precisely, subsequently covering the fetal 
age, too9.
The principle of serving the best interests of the child underpins the Greek law of 
minors in its entirety (see articles 1511 and 1536 of the Civil Code on parental deci-
sions on the exercise of parental care; articles 1542 and 1558 on serving the interests 
of the adopted child; article 1648 on serving the child under guardianship; and article 
1664 sub-par. a. on serving the child under foster care). Ιn fact, in the case of MAR, 
Law 3305/2005 stipulates in article 1 par. 2 that, when applying the relevant medical 
procedures, the best interests of the child that is to be born should primarily be taken 
into consideration. It is noted that the use of the word “primarily” indicates that in 
the case of MAR it is not only the interests of the child that are taken into considera-
tion, suggesting that other criteria are also worthy of balancing. In the opposite case, 
there would be the risk that the law on MAR becomes stricter than necessary, thus 
limiting the access thereto to very few people10. 
III. Examples of conflict between the best interests of the child and the 
reproductive right
Α. HIV carriers and their right of recourse to MAR methods
The capability of HIV carriers, as well as of carriers of other contagious diseases, to 
have access to methods of assisted reproduction has become a matter of concern11. As 
specified in article 4 par. 2 of Law 3305/2005, prior to submission to MAR methods, 
an obligatory check is conducted regarding, in particular, the potential viral infection 
from human immunodeficiency (HIV1, HIV2), hepatitis B, C and syphilis12. In the 
case where HIV-positive persons become involved in the application of methods of 
MAR, a special license is required by the National MAR Authority (hereinafter the 
“Authority”), (article 4 par. 3 of Law 3305/2005)13.
To begin with, it should be noted that for a considerable period of time the li-
censing Authority was not fully functional14. Even after its re-establishment, and for 
a long period thereafter in the absence of the issuance of the required presidential 
decree, the Authority was not granting any such license to assisted reproduction 
centers. As a result of these, these centers proceeded, to an extent necessarily and 
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partially also justifiably so, with MAR applications, so as not to halt the reproductive 
function (and, obviously, also in order not to obstruct the corresponding economic 
activity deriving thereof through reproductive tourism); however, they did so with-
out the required license and without being subject to the necessary controls with re-
spect to their operating conditions. It is expected that, following the recent issuance 
of presidential decree No. 10/2016 (18.2.2016), the granting of operation licenses 
to MAR centers will be normalized.
This issue was, in fact, raised previously before the Authority15 in the case of a 
forty-year-old female HIV carrier and former user of intravenous drugs, who was 
receiving methadone treatment for addiction at the time of requesting said license 
from the Authority. She was also a positive carrier of the hepatitis C virus, for which 
she was being monitored at a public hospital and was undergoing appropriate antiret-
roviral therapy, showing great consistency. Due to, most likely, the administration of 
methadone, the woman presented secondary amenorrhea and, while her husband was 
seronegative, he had moderate asthenospermia. The couple requested that the Au-
thority grant them license for intrauterine insemination. The Authority clarified that 
the child’s interests are not affected if “the conventional expectations as to its future 
prosperity” are satisfied and, driven by this reasoning; it held that there are adequate 
control systems that reduce the likelihood of contagion significantly. With regard 
to the fact that the average life expectancy of the mother may be reduced, the ob-
servation was made that AIDS treatments have evolved considerably and, therefore, 
the life expectancy of HIV carriers has increased. It was further noted that regarding 
other diseases associated with reduced life expectancy, the relative legislation does not 
set restrictions as to reproduction. It is highlighted, however, that the Authority has 
imposed on doctors an increased duty to provide information to couples regarding 
risks and the required special care towards the woman.
According to recent studies in the USA, 25% to 45% of HIV carriers wish to 
become future parents16. Through the adoption of optimal treatment during preg-
nancy, the child’s risk of infection has been reduced to 1-2%. Studies also indicate 
that pregnancy does not accelerate the spreading of the virus17. Nevertheless, despite 
these encouraging data, seropositive people often experience resistance on the part of 
health services, as well as pressure from society aiming towards their exclusion from 
the right to reproduction. As a result of this social stigma, in addition to their forced 
sterilization in some jurisdictions18, seropositive people were initially reluctant to 
claim their right to parenthood. This climate is gradually changing, mainly due to 
encouraging medical research. It was due to this reason that the Ethics Committee 
of the American Committee for Reproductive Medicine held in 2010 that assisted 
reproduction centers should extend as much as possible the access provided to HIV 
carriers who wish to become parents19. 
It is obvious that the entire project can only be carried out via the creation of suit-
able facilities for the safe care of the carriers who wish to gain access to MAR units. 
Towards this direction, article 5 of ministerial decision No. 6901/2015 provides for 
the safety conditions of reproduction centers, so as to prevent the transmission of the 
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infection to healthcare personnel and other persons under treatment.
Given that the risk of infection is actually higher in other diseases than in the 
case of HIV20, according to current medical knowledge, there is no need for any 
moral differentiation of the HIV case from other contagious diseases21 and, therefore, 
stakeholders should balance responsibly all the factors before deciding, on the basis 
of specific information22.
Β. Creation of a single-parent family
Article 1456 par. 1 indent b. of the Greek Civil Code recognizes the right of the 
unmarried woman to be subject to MAR, irrespective of whether or not she is in a 
free association. The equivalent right of the single man has also been acknowledged 
in case-law23. The legislator allows the establishment of a single-parent family with 
a single mother or even with a single father. The legitimate question that arises is 
whether it is in the child’s best interests to grow up with only one parent. It is argued 
that having children as a single parent “is contrary to the protection which the State 
should guarantee to childhood, according to article 21 par. 1 of the Constitution”24. 
The obvious answer to this would be that it is best for the child to have two parents. 
Oftentimes, however, reality supersedes the ideal family standards and it is not a rare 
case to see one of the parents disappearing without undertaking his/her obligations 
towards the child. The reasonable thought is that it is better to regulate something 
that we do not like, rather than to leave it unregulated and thus open to many abuses 
against the child. Notwithstanding this, however, certain objections are worthy of 
attention: Indeed, there are many cases of single-parent families, but our law pro-
vides for safeguard provisions in favor of the child’s best interests, so that the father 
acknowledges the paternity of the child born to him, whether voluntarily or invol-
untarily25, by securing at least some financial support on his part, if not his actual 
physical presence. The reality of a mother raising her child on her own should not be 
renamed as an unlimited right to create her own family alone. 
C. Post-mortem fertilization
Article 1457 of the Civil Code provides for the conditions under which fertili-
zation is permitted following the death of the spouse or the man26 with whom the 
woman lived together in free association. What is permitted in this instance, too, 
presupposes the existence of medical necessity and, in particular, that the spouse or 
permanent partner should have suffered from a disease associated with a potential 
risk of infertility; or that a risk of him dying should have existed; and also that the 
spouse or permanent partner should have consented to post-mortem fertilization on 
the basis of a special notarial deed. The question arises whether this provision “does 
the child an injustice, by planning its development without a father”27. The legal 
justification is that since single-parent families are allowed, it is preferable, instead of 
ignoring the technical capability of post mortem insemination, to have it legally reg-
ulated, in order for it to be “vested with certain guarantees”28. Therefore, any arising 
questions are primarily focused on the creation of single-parent families, rather than 
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on the question of whether post mortem insemination is permitted or not.
D. The age of parents and donors
The establishment of an upper age limit for participants in MAR suggests that the 
legislator is concerned about whether the parents can meet the needs of their child in 
the best possible way29. Furthermore, pregnancy at an advanced age is associated with a 
higher risk for the woman’s health and life and, therefore, these risks of hers also affect 
the child negatively. Additionally, in the case of homologous artificial insemination, 
the use of genetic material from parents of an advanced age increases the risk of birth 
of children with chromosomal aberrations and congenital defects. Therefore, article 4 
par. 1 of Law 3305/2005 provides that MAR methods apply to adults up until their age 
of natural reproductive capacity, making also clear that for women this limit may not 
exceed the fiftieth year. Despite the explicit legislative provision, case-law has accepted 
certain deviations, e.g. in the case of granting a license to a fifty-two-year-old woman 
to gestate the child of her daughter, who suffered from the Rokitansky30 syndrome.
The differentiation between men and women, however, causes concern, given 
that when it comes to adoption a common upper age limit applies for men and wom-
en wishing to become prospective adoptive parents31. In fact, the view is expressed 
that this specific limit should be perceived as referring to both members of the cou-
ple32. This argument is further supported if the shorter life expectancy of the male33 
is also taken into account.
At the same time, the legislator intervenes in the matter of the disposal of genetic 
material, defining as the time limit for a male-donor the age of forty years and for a 
female-donor the age of thirty-five years, providing that these age limits may in some 
cases be extended until the fiftieth and fortieth year respectively, on the grounds of 
important reasons, following an Authority’s decision (articles 7 par. 7.c and 8 par. 
7.a of Law 3305/2005). These age limits, as defined by the legislator, are mostly as-
sociated with the “quality and durability of the genetic material, which are impaired 
over the course of time”34.
In article 4 par. 1 of Law 3305/2005, the eighteenth year is defined by the legisla-
tor as the lowest limit for recourse to assisted reproduction techniques, presumably so 
that the parents have the maturity that is required by their demanding parental role. 
Nevertheless, this rule is not rigid if the childbearing capacity cannot be ensured due 
to serious disease that may present a high infertility risk. 
Τhe age criterion, therefore, as regards the upper as well as the lowest limit, is 
examined each time on a case-by-case basis, considering the child’s best interests as 
a key factor.
Ε. Same-sex couples and their right of recourse to MAR methods
The ability to appeal to MAR methods has been a long-standing request of ho-
mosexuals’ associations. For the analysis of this issue as a whole, it would be useful to 
take into account the following: 
First, the specific nature of same-sex couples consists in that, under both of 
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their forms of composition, they are not able reproduce naturally like heterosexual 
couples do35. As a result, recognizing the right of reproduction to same-sex couples 
would lead to the abolition of the subsidiary nature of the therapeutic reproduc-
tion which governs our legislation36. In particular, according to article 1455 of the 
Greek Civil Code, the implementation of all reproductive techniques is permitted 
only in cases of infertility or danger of transmission of hereditary diseases.
Secondly, it should not be overlooked that the homosexuals’ associations are gain-
ing more and more ground in social and legal acceptance. The stable cohabitation of 
people of the same-sex is a social reality that creates social needs, to which the legisla-
tor has responded. A characteristic example is the recently enacted Law 4356/2015, 
with article 1 of said Law providing for the ability to contract a registered partnership 
irrespective of gender. It is noted, however, that this law does not provide same-sex 
couples with the option to appeal to MAR. 
Τhirdly, many same-sex couples have children indirectly, as one member (he/or 
she) of the same-sex couples may divest him/herself of his/her sexual orientation and 
appear alone before a MAR center37 in order to request assisted reproduction assis-
tance under the pretext of wishing to create a single-parent family (article 1456 of 
the Civil Code), receive post-mortem insemination (article 1457 of the Civil Code) 
and/or have recourse to surrogacy (article 1458 of the Civil Code), which leads to 
raising the child together with his/her same-sex/also homosexual partner, subject to 
the constraint that the other partner is not legally considered as the child’s parent. 
Moreover, there are many similar types of couples living abroad, in countries where 
such arrangements are covered by relevant legislation, and it is not unlikely that they 
may seek to live in Greece at some point. The exclusion of this type of family struc-
ture, however, may not be in the child’s best interests, especially if said child will 
have already been recognized as member of a family in one legal system, while this 
family form is not acceptable in another. Are these children at risk of being regarded 
as inferior when compared to those being raised by heterosexual parents? The result-
ing question is who will undertake the care of the child of a homosexual mother or a 
homosexual father, in the event when the declared single mother or father (where, in 
actual fact, they were not truly single, but they were declared at the MAR center as 
such, because the law does not provide them with another more “sincere” alternative) 
dies, or if he/she is not capable of undertaking the care of his/her children38. The 
partner of the single parent is not authorized by our legal system to undertake the care 
of said child and, consequently, the child remains legally unprotected. 
Fourthly, the best interests of the child should be assessed as a whole and not be 
invoked solely for the avoidance of structures facing social prejudice. If the reason for 
the homosexuals’ exclusion from MAR services is to preclude the social stigmatiza-
tion of the child, then the same stigma may torment the child even if the parent is 
transsexual39, incarcerated40, a drug dealer, etc. 
The reasonable question arising is how can all these data co-exist in harmony 
with the child’s best interests. The legislator is not required to provide solutions to 
all the questions immediately. As a matter of fact, any changes need to be distilled 
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by society and require education and dialogue. The registered partnership option 
that has now become available to same-sex couples is the first step: moving for-
ward, it may well be the case that the right to same-sex marriage may follow. This 
does not automatically translate into a recognition of the right to have children. 
As the ECHR has held, sexual preference does not render a parent incapable or 
unfit to take care of his/her children41. Therefore, all that should be considered is 
whether the raising of children by parents of the same sex puts the interests of the 
child in jeopardy. This is a multifaceted problem that cannot be resolved solely 
by the legislator. The legislator will determine the conditions, relying mainly on 
the findings of pediatrics and psychology. According to the American Academy of 
Pediatrics, the best interests of the child are not affected by the heterosexuality or 
homosexuality of its parents. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends 
recognizing marriage and the ability to adopt children irrespective of the gender 
of the prospective parents42. Nevertheless, it seems that this conclusion cannot be 
transmitted “by remote control” into a different society without it having been 
distilled properly by society in advance. It is very likely that, if any change occurs 
swiftly in an unprepared society, the child will be at the center of stigmatization 
and social prejudice. Therefore, whatever steps may be taken, they should be per-
formed slowly.
IV. Remarks
A. Choice of terminology driven by the child’s best interests
The legislator’s choice to use specific terminology predisposes us about his genu-
ine will, and this is where the terminology referring to “genetic material”, “fertilized 
ovum”, “fetus”, “embryo”, “unborn child”, “child”, clearly shows that there is no 
neutral language (on merit) (value–free language) in legal science. Even though the 
Greek legislator has set the child’s best interests as a clause, he denies the use of the 
term “embryo” by opting for the term “fertilized ovum” instead. The National Bio-
ethics Committee noted in an Opinion on medically assisted reproduction that the 
use of the term “genetic material” in relation to the period of the early development 
of the embryo should be avoided43. It is noted, however, that the 2015 Cypriot Law 
on the application of medically assisted reproduction {69(I)/2015} in Cyprus defines 
“embryo” as the result of the fertilization of an ovum by a sperm44. The difference in 
terminology between the Greek and the Cypriot law is potentially suggestive of the 
legislator’s intention to provide a different kind of protection. Nevertheless, the true 
interests of the child require the selection of terminology leading to the highest possi-
ble protection. It seems that the term “fertilized ovum”, used instead of the term “em-
bryo”, implies that the fertilized ovum does not have the same value as the fetus and, 
therefore, it does not deserve the same protection. Τhere is a reasonable suspicion that 
the legislator considers this as something which belongs only to those who requested 
the realization of the relevant medical act45. It leads us, however, to the “paradox that 
man begins to live as a thing and eventually becomes a person46.” The reasonable 
question that arises then is whether this differentiation is only valid for extracorporeal 
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generated embryos47 or for all embryos. Should people who are created under the pro-
cess of assisted reproduction “be reconciled with the idea that, in the early stages of 
their lives, they were ‘human material’ ”48?
The legislator’s will is that the fertilized ovum is essentially something which be-
longs to those who asked for the realization of the specific medical act and, for that 
reason, it is requested of them to decide on its fate49. Therefore, the term “embryo in 
vitro” seems to be more in favor of the child’s interest. Subsequently, we should not 
overlook the fact that “we are facing a new human life, whose characteristics have 
been irrevocably designated, as a fertilized ovum can no longer be fertilized again by 
another sperm”50. Beyond any other legal concerns, “the treatment of the fertilized 
ovum as a thing leads us to an ontological confusion, as we blur the boundaries 
between the inorganic and organic world, overlooking that this distinction is funda-
mental”51.
B. The issue of recognition and acceptance in the Greek territory of family 
models that are not permitted in Greece, but which have been established in 
other countries
The question raised is how our legal system should treat family structures that 
have been recognized in other jurisdictions. A relevant example is described in 
Italy52, where a homosexual couple consisting of an Italian and a Spanish woman 
were lawfully married in Spain and registered their son at the Spanish Registry office. 
The child was born by heterologous insemination with a donation from a third do-
nor, with the ovum coming from the Italian woman, while the Spanish woman was 
the carrying mother. The Italian Registry office refused to register the child because, 
on the one hand, Italian law prohibits heterologous insemination and, on the other 
hand, it does not recognize the marriage between homosexuals or family structures 
deriving from homosexual couples. Therefore, the Italian authorities refused to grant 
the Italian citizenship to the child. It is strongly argued that Italy, being a European 
Union Member State, should not refuse to recognize the right of free movement53 of 
European citizens and their families54. The issue is resolved as follows: First, under the 
Treaty, the rights regarding the free movement of persons have been granted to (a) 
the citizens of the Union and (b) their “family” members. Secondly, both women and 
the child are citizens of the Union and, therefore, they have the primary right of free 
movement within the Union, freedom of establishment and equal treatment. Thirdly, 
the above persons are not family members, because according to article 2 par. 2 sec. 
b and c of Directive 2004/38/EC, family members are also the partner (he /or she) 
with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of 
the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats 
registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the condi-
tions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State, and the direct 
descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse 
or partner . Thus, Italy is entitled not to recognize the “marriage” or “their” child and 
validly refuses to grant the Italian citizenship thereto. At the same time, however, they 
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are accepted as citizens of the Union (the first partner as a citizen of Italy and the sec-
ond partner and the child as citizens of Spain) and all the rights that they are entitled 
to under the Treaty are recognized. In any case, they do not constitute a ‘family’ in 
Italy, and this is something that does not, in fact, contrary to EU legislation.
The issue of children without relatives is a major legal issue for the child who is 
born, and it is linked to its personal circumstances (nationality, kinship)55. Laying 
the foundation of kinship is a human right based on the constitutional protection 
of human dignity (article 2 par. 1 of the Constitution) and privacy (article 9 of the 
Constitution, article 8 ECHR), but also on the right of the child to family life (article 
8 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child)56. This issue, however, 
should not only involve the State to which it is addressed, but also the parents or the 
doctors who break the law, mainly in cases of reproductive tourism57. The question 
that arises is whether the Greek domestic law should show the appropriate flexibil-
ity in recognizing family relationships that are valid in other countries or not. This 
acceptance does not, however, stem from the principle of free movement of persons 
and their families within the European Union58, as these families are not recognized 
by the host state. The non-recognition appears on the one hand to be contrary to the 
best interests of the child, whereas, on the other hand, recognition may have eventu-
ally led to an abuse of the non-acceptance of alternative family structures.
V. By way of conclusion
Co-existence in the same society requires respect for our fellow citizen. Therefore, 
no one can claim to be wearing the crown of absolute correctness when it comes to his/
her own position60. Even if alternative family structures that differ from those person-
ally chosen by many other people are accepted, particular emphasis should be given on 
whether these structures actually serve the best interests of the child, so that the audible 
cries of those who are fighting for their rights do not overshadow the faint voices of the 
children.
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